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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As nations attempt to rebound from the global recession of 
the late 2000s, political leaders continue to scramble to improve 
their domestic and supranational economies.
1
 Governments 
have confronted “the difficult task of spurring current growth 
and employment without saddling their economies with so 
much debt that they sacrifice long-term growth and financial 
stability.”
2
 The Office of the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), along with economists and policy 
analysts, believe that free trade agreements (FTAs)
3
 offer a 
sensible means to spur economic growth, trade, and 
investment,
4
 thereby adding jobs and increasing prosperity 
throughout affected areas.
5
 FTAs eliminate barriers to trade 
 
†
 J.D., University of San Diego School of Law, 2012; B.A., University of 
California, San Diego, 2009. The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial 
staff of the Minnesota Journal of International Law, particularly Articles 
Editor Russell Squire for his dedication and commitment demonstrated 
throughout the editing process.  
 1. Josh Bivens, Andrew Fieldhouse, & Heidi Shierholtz, From Free Fall 
to Stagnation, ECON. POLICY INST. (Feb.14, 2013), 
http://www.epi.org/publication/bp355-five-years-after-start-of-great-recession/.  
 2. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2013). 
 3. WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356, FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE 
POLICY 1-2 (2012) (defining an FTA as an agreement between two or more 
countries that reduces or eliminates government interference in trade).  
 4. Id. at 9-10; Free Trade Agreements, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 5. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356 at 1–2.  
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between countries.
6
 Contrary to their name, however, they may 
pose costly side effects when implemented improperly.
7
  
FTAs can greatly increase a country’s exports by reducing 
or eliminating import quotas, export subsidies, and protective 
tariffs.
8
 The United States actively promotes FTAs
9
 as an 
excellent way to open up foreign markets to exporters.
10
 In 
2010, 41% of all U.S. exports went to FTA partner countries, 
11
 
with exports to such countries growing at a faster rate than 
 
 6. Id. at 9-10.  
 7. See Americans Are of Two Minds on Trade, PEW RES. CENTER (Nov. 
10, 2010), http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/11/09/americans-are-of-two-
minds-on-trade/; Joseph Stiglitz, So-called Free Trade Talks Should Be in the 
Public, Not Corporate Interest, GUARDIAN ECON. BLOG (July 5, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/economics-blog/2013/jul/05/free-trade-
talks-public-corporate-interest.  
 8. See Free Trade Agreements, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
http://trade.gov/fta/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2013); See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. 
COOPERATION & DEV.[OECD], CHINA IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: AN OECD 
ECONOMIC AND STATISTICAL SURVEY 761-65 (2003) (demonstrating the 
augmentation of exports and economic welfare in wake of the reduction of 
quotas and tariffs in China between 1996 and 2000); Gene M. Grossman & 
Alan B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade 
Agreement (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 3914, 1991), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3914.pdf?new_window=1 (“A 
reduction in trade barriers generally will affect the environment by expanding 
the scale of economic activity, by altering the composition of economic activity, 
and by bringing about a change in the techniques of production.”). 
 9. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31356 at 1–2 (noting that FTAs have 
played an integral role in U.S. foreign policy since 1994).  
 10. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 8; See, e.g., Michael J. Boskin, 
Op-Ed, World Watches Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Talks, JAPAN TIMES, July 
28, 2013, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/28/commentary 
/world-watches-trans-atlantic-free-trade-talks/#.UgEqbmR4Yap ("[The Trans-
Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership] would eliminate all trade tariffs 
and reduce nontariff barriers, including in agriculture; expand market access 
in services trade; bring about closer regulatory harmonization; strengthen 
intellectual-property protection; restrict subsidies to state-owned enterprises; 
and more.”); Marjorie Olster, U.S. Hopes Free Trade Negotiations Will Drive 
Changes in Europe's Economy to Promote Growth, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 
30, 2013, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/us-hopes-trade-talks-will-
spur-changes-europe (“The U.S. hopes negotiations for a free trade deal with 
the European Union will drive growth-oriented reforms in the EU economy, 
the top American trade official said Tuesday. In a similar vein, U.S. Trade 
Representative Michael Froman said China's recent agreement to negotiate a 
bilateral investment treaty with the United States is a chance to press for 
economic reforms in the Asian giant that could level the playing field for 
American businesses.”). 
 11. See INT’L TRADE ADMIN., supra note 8 (noting that FTAs continue to 
become increasingly important to the American economy). 
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those to the rest of the world.
12
 The United States currently 
maintains FTAs with twenty countries,
13
 and in the wake of 
Senate confirmation of Michael Froman as Trade 
Representative, the USTR appears ready to actively negotiate 
additional agreements.
14
 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
one such agreement currently under negotiation, stands to 
become the largest free trade agreement in the world.
15
  
The negotiating history of the TPP dates back to 2005 
when New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, and Brunei signed an 
FTA known as the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership Agreement (TPSEP).
16
 The TPSEP’s founding 
members agreed to an accession clause that promoted accession 
by other countries.
17
 Negotiations for the current, expanded 
version of this agreement, now known as the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership or TPP, began in 2009,
18
 with new negotiating 
partners added in the years since.
19
 Today there are eleven 
negotiating partners: the original four members, the United 
States, Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, and 
Vietnam.
20
 The TPP is designed to expand. As talks progress,
21
 
the potential for additional members continues. Currently the 
 
 12. Id.  
 13. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 4.  
 14. Id.; Jim Abrams, Michael Froman Confirmed as U.S. Trade 
Representative, HUFFINGTON POST, June 19, 2013, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/19/michael-froman-
confirmed_n_3469031.html. 
 15. What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, CBC NEWS, 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/what-is-the-trans-pacific-partnership-1.1147888 
(last updated June 21, 2012, 9:49 AM).  
 16. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations, N.Z. MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-
Relations/2-Trade-Relationships-and-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/ (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2013). 
 17. Ariella Park, Explainer: What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership?, 
AMERICAS SOC’Y/COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.as-
coa.org/articles/explainer-what-trans-pacific-partnership. 
 18. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-outreach-and-
updates (last visited Oct. 18, 2013) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP]. 
 19. IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012).  
 20. Id. 
 21. There have been 18 rounds of negotiations, the last taking place in 
July 2013 in Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. See U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, supra note 18.  
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admission of Japan is facing intense debate.
22
 With the 
admission of more member countries, the potential for the TPP 
to widen its geographic and economic influence on the zone of 
free trade will grow.
23
 
Enacting the expanded version of the TPP would likely 
have significant global economic effects.
24
 The existing TPP 
countries have a combined GDP of close to $20 trillion and a 
combined population of over 650 million.
 25
 Experts speculate 
that “if enacted, the TPP would eliminate 11,000 tariff lines 
among the parties” and “could serve as a template for future 
trade pacts among countries in the [Asian-Pacific region],”
26
 an 
area that “accounts for nearly 60% of global GDP and roughly 
50% of international trade.”
27
 The Asian-Pacific market is one 
of the fasting growing in the world; goods traded in the market 
have “increased 300% since 1990 with a 400% increase in 
global investment in the region.”
28
 Involving Pacific countries in 
the TPP would open additional markets to the United States 
and help to alleviate the United States’ staggering $558 billion 
trade deficit in goods and services remaining from 2011.
29
  
 
 22. A TPP Stimulus For Japan, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2012, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100008723963904438194045776329537340086
64.html . 
 23. Deborah Elms, NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, Getting the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Over the Finish Line, NBR ANALYSIS BRIEF, Oct. 22, 2012, 
available at 
http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/brief/102212_Elms_TPP.pdf.  
 24. See The Significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership for the United 
States: Hearing on U.S. Trade Strategy: What's Next for Small Business 
Exports? Before the H. Small Bus. Comm., 112th Cong. (2012) (testimony of 
Joshua Meltzer, Fellow of Global Economy and Development at the Brookings 
Institute), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/ 
05/16-us-trade-strategy-meltzer; Meredith Kolsky-Lewis, The Trans-Pacific 
Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT'L & 
COMP. L. REV. 27, 28-29, 51-52 (2011).  
 25. Christopher Sands, How the Trans-Pacific Partnership Will Change 
Canada, HUFFINGTON POST (CANADA) June 19, 2012, available at 
http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9003; 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement Negotiations, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T 
OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/tpp/ (last visited Oct. 
19, 2012). 
 26. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Robert E. Scott, U.S. Trade Deficit Up in 2011, China Accounted for 
Three-fourths of Rise in Non-oil Goods Trade Deficit, ECON. POLICY INST. (Feb. 
10, 2012), http://www.epi.org/publication/trade-deficit-2011-china-accounted-
fourths/. 
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FTAs have the ability to affect more than just trade.
30
 In 
addition to increased trade flows, FTAs promote innovation, 
competition, growth, and economic freedom.
31
 A uniform FTA 
“foster[s] a wellspring of freedom, opportunity, and prosperity” 
that benefits member nations as well as citizens at-large.
32
 
Despite the significant economic impacts of FTAs, they can also 
negatively influence areas such as the environment.
33
 Since the 
dawn of industrialization, as trade, investment, and 
globalization have boomed, so too have concerns over their 
environmental impact.
34
 Environmental indicators show that 
climate change, conservation, energy, pollution, and resource 
depletion are all directly related to trade.
35
 Climate change, 
biodiversity, and glacier melt worsen as global trade 
increases,
36
 ultimately leading to resource depletion, plant and 
animal extinction, flooding, drought, and starvation.
37
 
According to a DARA and Climate Vulnerable Forum report, if 
current trends persist, more than 100 million deaths may be 
attributable to climate change and a carbon-intensive economy 
by 2030.
38
 The economic effects of climate change loom large, 
 
 30. See Responsible Trade Program: Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, 
SIERRA CLUB, http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/trans-pacific-partnership-
agreement.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 31. Scott L. Baiera & Jeffrey H. Bergstrand, Do Free Trade Agreements 
Actually Increase Members' International Trade?, J. OF INT’L ECON., Oct. 2004, 
at 1, available at 
http://www3.nd.edu/~jbergstr/Working_Papers/BaierBergstrandFTA2Oct2004.
pdf (“Stated succinctly, this estimate suggests that an FTA will on average 
increase two member countries’ trade about 86 percent after 15 years.”); 
Joanne Gowa & Edward D. Mansfield, Power Politics and International Trade, 
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 408, 416 (1993) (“[Free trade alliances] exert a direct, 
statistically significant, and large effect on bilateral trade flows.”). 
 32. Denise H. Froning, The Benefits of Free Trade: A Guide for 
Policymakers, HERITAGE FOUNDATION, 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2000/08/the-benefits-of-free-trade-a-
guide-for-policymakers (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
 33. See SIERRA CLUB, supra note 30.  
 34. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME [UNEP], Key Economic Indicators, UNEP 
Y.B. 2012: EMERGING ISSUES IN OUR GLOBAL Env’t 51–65 (2012), available at 
http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2012/pdfs/UYB_2012_CH_4.pdf. 
 35. SIERRA CLUB, TRADING AWAY OUR CLIMATE? HOW INVESTMENT 
RULES THREATEN THE ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE PROTECTION, available at 
http://www.sierraclub.org/trade/resources/Investor-State-Climate-TPP-6-4.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter TRADING AWAY OUR CLIMATE].  
 36. See UNEP, supra note 34. 
 37. Id. 
 38. DARA, REPORT: CLIMATE CRISIS ALREADY CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED 
DAMAGE TO WORLD ECONOMY; HUMAN IMPACT ON LARGE-SCALE (2012), 
available at http://daraint.org/wp-
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already costing the world $1.2 trillion a year in foregone 
prosperity.
39
 Consequently, countries must consider the effects 
that an increase in trade will have on the environment before 
contemplating new FTAs. If the environmental issues are not 
addressed when drafting new FTAs, then the trade becomes far 
from free.
40
  
This article examines the proposed expanded version of the 
TPP and its potential environmental effects. Part II examines 
the specific environmental effects of two previous multilateral 
trade agreements entered into by the United States. Part III 
discusses the TPP itself, the environmental areas it could 
influence, and the benefits of including environment provisions 
that promote sustainability within the TPP. Part IV proposes 
solutions to ensure that the TPP adequately protects 
environmental interests. The article concludes by analyzing the 
likelihood that the TPP would succeed in its environmental 
goals.  
 
II.  THE EFFECTS OF FTAS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
Free trade efforts and environmental protection have 
seldom gone hand in hand;
41
 although the World Trade 
Organization believes there is no reason that the two cannot do 
so.
42
 However, before they can be reconciled the nearly limitless 
permutations by which an FTA can affect the environment 
must be realized.
43
 The links between free trade agreements 
and the environment include production, management, 
technology, physical infrastructure, social organization, and 
government policy.
44
 The policy and structure behind a FTA, as 
 
content/uploads/2012/09/CVM_RELEASE_FINAL_ENGLISH.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 19, 2013).  
 39. Id. 
 40. See TRADING AWAY OUR CLIMATE, supra note 35. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Uruguay Round Trade Negotiations Committee in Marrakesh, Full 
text of the Decision on Trade and Environment (Apr. 14, 1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu5_e.htm (calling for the 
establishment of a Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) on the 
occasion of signing the Marrakesh Agreement).  
 43. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. [FAO], International Trade, the 
Environment and Sustainable Agricultural Development, THE STATE OF FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURE, AGRICULTURAL TRADE: ENTERING A NEW ERA?, 278–92 
(1995), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/v6800e/v6800e.pdf.  
 44. Comm’n for Envtl. Cooperation [CEC], Analytic Framework for 
Assessing the Environmental Effects of the North American Free Trade 
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well as the economic, political, or legal means it utilizes can 
also determine the extent of its impact on the environment.
45
 
For example, although increases in production and physical 
infrastructure are likely to negatively impact the environment, 
government policy offers, perhaps, the most visible and 
effective way for an FTA to combat such impact.
46
 Governments 
provide environmental support through direct expenditures, 
tax regimes, credit, subsidies, user-charges, set-asides, and 
conservation programs.
47
 Governments also provide 
environmental support through the regulation of negative 
factors, such as greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
48
 Still, too 
much regulation should be avoided to prevent the risk of 
stifling trade and defeating the underlying purpose of the 
FTA.
49
  
Determining an efficient level of FTA regulation depends 
greatly on discovering the environmental effects of a certain 
FTA, which can prove problematic.
50
 Environmental changes, 
such as increases in GHG emissions or decreases in air quality 
or biodiversity, are often caused by multiple factors, making 
them difficult to measure and hard to attribute to just one 
FTA.
51
 Still, most global indicators demonstrate an overall 
environmental decline that shows no sign of slowing down.
52
 
 
Agreement, at 1, 59 (1999), available at 
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/trade_environ_econ/pdfs/frmwrk-e.pdf.  
 45. Id. at 6.  
 46. Id. at 59.  
 47. Id. at 73. 
 48. Id. at 32.  
 49. Id. at 4.  
 50. Id. at 70.  
 51. See generally UNEP, Reference Manual for the Integrated Assessment 
of Trade-Related Policies (2001), available at http://www.unep.ch/etb/ 
publications/intAssessment/refmaniaFinal.pdf.; Colin Kirkpatrick & Norman 
Lee, Inst.for Dev. Policy and Mgmt., Univ. of Manchester, Further 
Development of the Methodology for a Sustainability Impact Assessment of 
Proposed WTO Negotiations: Final Report to the European Commission (2002), 
available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/february/tradoc_112353.pdf; 
Alejandro Nedal, CEC, Issue Study 1. Maize in Mexico: Some Environmental 
Implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement, available at 
http://www.cec.org/Storage/52/4483_engmaize_EN.pdf.  
 52. See XAVIER LEFLAIVE, ET AL., Water, in OECD ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTLOOK TO 2050: THE CONSEQUENCES OF INACTION 207–73 (2012); WORLD 
WILDLIFE FUND, LIVING PLANET REPORT 2012: BIODIVERSITY, BIOCAPACITY, 
AND BETTER CHOICES (Monique Grooten et al. eds., 2012); Air Pollution 
Worsening Worldwide: Cut Emissions Further, Experts Urge, SCI. DAILY, Aug. 
1, 2012, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2012/08/120801112609.htm.  
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Furthermore, with the world population predicted to reach 9 
billion by 2050,
53
 the increased threat of environmental scarcity 
will make operating an efficient international trade system, 
predicated upon the neoclassical trade theory of comparative 
advantage, a market and economic imperative.
54
  
 
III. MULTILATERAL FTAS INVOLVING THE UNITED 
STATES 
 
A well-known premise is that past behavior is the best 
indicator of future behavior. Thus, by examining the 
environmental effects of past trade agreements, and how they 
dealt with environmental issues, we can ascertain a reasonable 
expectation of the environmental impact of the TPP.  
 
A. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
came into force in 1994.
55
 Signed by the United States, Canada, 
and Mexico, NAFTA created the largest free trade area in the 
world.
56
 So far, NAFTA has accomplished its goal to increase 
trade and eliminate barriers to trade and investment between 
these countries.
57
 From 1993 to 2010, U.S. exports to Canada 
and Mexico rose 190%.
58
 Often credited as the first FTA of its 
kind in sheer size and influence, NAFTA is also the first 
multilateral FTA to include environmental provisions.
59
 After 
 
 53. U.N.: Earth's Population to Hit 9 Billion by 2050, 10 Billion by 2100, 
CNN, May 4, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-
03/us/united.nations.population.forecast_1_population-forecast-population-
growth-fertility?_s=PM:US. 
 54. See Rüdiger Pethig, Pollution, Welfare, and Environmental Policy in 
the Theory of Comparative Advantage, 2 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 160, 160 
(1976).  
 55. North American Free Trade Agreement, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, http://www.ustr.gov 
/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-american-free-trade-
agreement-nafta (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. Dale Colyer, Environmental Impacts of Agricultural Trade under 
NAFTA (Feb. 2–6, 2002) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the Southern Agricultural Economics Association, West Virginia 
University), available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/19104/1 
/cp02co01.pdf. 
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pressure from the Clinton administration to address 
environmental problems, the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was negotiated and 
signed as a supplement to NAFTA.
60
 NAAEC’s primary focus 
was to ensure that each NAFTA member effectively enforced 
environmental laws and regulations through appropriate 
governmental action;
61
 thereby preventing a race to the bottom 
scenario in which the least environmentally conscious country 
received the most investment.
62
  
To pursue this goal, the NAAEC established an 
intergovernmental organization, the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (CEC).
63
 The CEC consists of the 
Council,
64
 Secretariat,
65
 and Joint Public Advisory Committee 
(JPAC),
66
 and fosters cooperation between NAFTA members to 
address the environmental issues of continent-wide free trade.
67
 
The CEC examines environmental trends in the region and 
advocates for environmental solutions.
68
 For example, the CEC 
proposed the development of an integrated North American 
electricity market that would maintain high levels of 
environmental protection.
69
 The CEC also identified areas of 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Mark R. Goldschmidt, Note, The Role of Transparency and Public 
Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 343, 356 (2001–02) (explaining that the Council serves as the forum for 
the discussion and promotion of environmental policies, and oversees the 
Secretariat by approving or overruling decisions).  
 65. Id. at 357 (noting that the Secretariat holds responsibility for most of 
the Commission's activities; including completing the Annual Report of the 
Commission and reviewing Submissions on Enforcement Matters from 
external parties). 
 66. Id. at 358 (noting that the JPAC, a fifteen-member panel, primarily 
provides advice to the Council or Secretariat using technical or scientific 
information).  
 67. CEC, Three Countries: One Environment (2006), available at 
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=1226&SiteNodeID=310&BL_ExpandID=
154 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).  
 68. Stephen P. Mumme, NAFTA and Environment: The North American 
Free Trade Agreement’s Impact on the Trinational Environment Remains 
Controversial, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www. 
fpif.org/reports/nafta_and_environment.
 
 69. Secretariat of the CEC, Environmental Challenges and Opportunities 
of the Evolving North American Electricity Market (June 2002), available at 
http://www.cec.org/Storage/31/2244_CEC_Art13electricity_Eng.pdf. 
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improvement in GHG inventory, comparability, and structure 
that would help mitigate climate change.
70
 The CEC also 
monitors NAFTA’s environmental impacts in areas such as 
pollution.
71
 Thus far, studies have been mixed, showing no 
general or overall environmental effect.
72
  
While the CEC has successfully created greater 
environmental awareness in NAFTA, it falls short of holding 
member countries to a high environmental standard.
73
 The 
CEC has no authority to enforce compliance.
74
 The NAAEC 
contains no provisions that allow the CEC to investigate 
unenforced regulations or examine decisions that roll back 
environmental laws.
75
 Even if the CEC had such authority, 
with an annual budget of only $9 million, (the same budget it 
received at its 1994 inception), its potential to influence 
environmental protection would be limited.
76
 Despite a $140 
million investment from NAFTA members, the CEC has done 
little to achieve its principal mandates or to foster tangible 
changes in government action.
77
 Furthermore, there is little if 
any evidence that the CEC work has influenced NAFTA 
members’ trade policies.
78
 Although the NAAEC adds little in 
terms of environmental protection to NAFTA, it may be unfair 
 
 70. CEC, Improving Comparability of Emissions Data, Methodologies and 
Inventories in North America, available at http://www.cec.org/Storage 
/130/15491_ghg_cec_projectsummary_en_web.pdf. 
 71. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Reinert & David W. Roland-Holst, CEC of N. 
Am., The Industrial Pollution Impacts of NAFTA: Some Preliminary Results 
(2000),  
available at 
http://www.cec.org/programs_projects/trade_environ_econ/pdfs/Reinert.pdf. 
 72. See Symposium, The Environmental Effects of Free Trade, Papers 
Presented at the North American Symposium on Assessing the Linkages 
between Trade and Environment, COMM’N FOR ENVTL. COOP. OF N. AM. (2000), 
available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/45/3763_symposium-e.pdf. 
 73. See Chris Dove, Comment, Can Voluntary Compliance Protect the 
Environment?: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, 
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 867, 881.  
 74. Id. at 882–83.  
 75. Id. at 881. 
 76. Katie Harr, NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and the Role of the Environment, 
COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFF. (Jan. 23, 2006), http://www.coha.org/nafta-
cafta-dr-and-the-role-of-the-environment/. 
 77. Linda J. Allen, The North American Agreement on Environmental 
Cooperation: Has It Fulfilled Its Promises and Potential? An Empirical Study 
of Policy, 23 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 121 (2012). 
 78. GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 302 (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds., 
2003). 
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to hold the treaty to a high standard considering it was the first 
FTA to include an environmental provision; NAFTA is, after 
all, first and foremost an economic agreement. Indeed, some 
environmental experts argue that the “most significant 
achievement of the environmental clauses [is] the fact that they 
existed at all . . . .”
79
  
 
1.NAFTA Chapter 11 
 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA contains provisions designed to 
protect cross-border investors and facilitate the settlement of 
investment disputes.
80
 Article 1110, the investor-state dispute 
settlement provision, provides:  
 
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment of an investor of another 
Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment 
(“expropriation”), except:  
(a) for a public purpose;  
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;  
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 
1105(1); and  
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with 
paragraphs 2 through 6.
81
 
 
Disputes under this section and the process for settling 
them have come under enormous scrutiny.
82
 Chapter 11 
establishes a mechanism for settling investment disputes. A 
NAFTA investor alleging that a host government breached its 
investment obligations under Chapter 11 may, at its option, 
pursue recourse under one of three arbitral mechanisms.
83
 The 
 
 79. Harr, supra note 76.  
 80. North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 639 [hereinafter NAFTA].  
 81. Id. at 641-42. 
 82. Bernard J. Roth, NAFTA, Alberta Oil Sands Royalties, and Change: 
Yes We Can?, 46 ALBERTA L. REV. 335, 363–64 (2009).  
 83. Overview of Disputes Between a Party and an Investor of Another 
Party, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx? 
tabid=93&language=en-US#Chapter11 (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) (noting that 
the three arbitral mechanisms available are the World Bank's International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the ICSID's 
Additional Facility Rules, and the rules of the United Nations Commission for 
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Chapter also indicates that “the investor may choose the 
remedies available in the host country’s domestic courts.”
84
 
Three-member tribunals hear investor-state arbitrations.
85
 
Tribunals must decide the disputes in accordance with the 
Agreement’s provisions, the applicable rules of international 
law, and all notes of interpretation issued by the NAFTA 
Commission.
86
 
On its face, Article 1110 does not pose any potential 
threats to environmental protection. NAFTA’s drafters erred, 
however, by failing to expressly define expropriation.
87
 As a 
result, arbitrators’ interpretation of the phrase “tantamount to 
expropriation”
88
 has seriously affected governments’ ability to 
protect the environment, as demonstrated by the following 
three cases. 
 
a.Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico 
 
The first case to interpret Chapter 11, Article 1110 was 
filed in 1997 by Metalclad Corporation, an American waste 
disposal company.
89
 In 1993, Metalclad purchased Coterin, a 
company that had secured a piece of land in the Mexican State 
of San Luis Potosi. Metalclad purchased the property with an 
assurance from Coterin and the Mexican federal government 
that all the necessary state and federal building permits to 
construct and operate a hazardous waste landfill on the land 
would be received.
90
 In 1994, Metalclad started construction on 
the landfill, despite the governor’s statement that he did not 
plan to grant Metalclad’s building permit.
91
 Federal officials 
assured Metalclad that the Guadalcazar municipality could not 
deny the permit and that the application was merely a 
 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules)). 
 84. Id. 
 85. NAFTA, supra note 80, at 644 (outlining that each party names one 
arbitrator, with the third arbitrator selected by mutual agreement, or failing 
agreement, by the Secretary-General of ICSID). 
 86. Id. at 645. 
 87. Roth, supra note 82, at 363. 
 88. NAFTA, supra note 80, at 644.  
 89. Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB (AF)/97/1, Final Award, ¶ 8 (August 30, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 212 (2002) 
[hereinafter Metalclad Final Award]. 
 90. Stephen Kass & Jean McCarroll, The ‘Metalclad’ Decision Under 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, N. Y. L. J. 3 (2000).  
 91. Id. 
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formality.
92
 However, when Metalclad attempted to open its 
new facility, local demonstrators and officials blocked the 
opening and the landfill remained closed until November 
1995.
93
 
In November 1995 Metalclad entered into an agreement 
with two federal agencies and the facility began operation.
94
 
Yet, in December 1995 Guadalcazar once again rejected 
Metalclad’s petition for a municipal building permit.
95
 
Guadalcazar also brought action against the federal 
government for illegally operating the landfill and successfully 
obtained a preliminary injunction barring further operations at 
the site.
96
 In September 1997 the governor issued a state-level 
decree that established the landfill site as a protected national 
property.
97
 Metalclad responded by filing a claim under Articles 
1105 and 1110 of NAFTA.
98
 The arbitral tribunal found in favor 
of Metalclad and awarded the company over $16 million in 
damages.
99
  
While the arbitral tribunal had good reason to find the 
Mexican federal government at fault under Article 1110, it 
should not have found the state of Mexico at fault, as well. By 
doing so, the tribunal interpreted Article 1110 too broadly. The 
tribunal found that: 
 
Expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, 
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such 
as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of 
title in favor of the host State, but also covert or 
incidental interference with the use of property which 
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in 
significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-
expected economic benefit of property even if not 
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.
100
 
 
 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 4. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Metalclad Final Award, supra note 89, at ¶131. 
 100. Id. at ¶103. 
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Incidental interference with the use of property that 
significantly deprives the owner of an important part of the 
expected benefit could apply to many scenarios where the 
government attempts to improve environmental protection 
laws.
101
 A wide application of this interpretation could have 
chilling effects on environmental regulation. It could result in 
lowered standards, because any law which limits carbon 
emissions, restricts pollutants, or sets other environmental 
standards has the potential to cause a loss of property.
102
 
Furthermore, although the tribunal did not award Metalclad 
losses for expected profits due to a lack of evidence, it 
recognized that lost profits should be considered in the 
valuation of expropriated property.
103
 By leaving the door open 
to award investors their lost profits, local governments could be 
forced to pay enormous damages or settlements when future 
claims arise. 
 
b.Ethyl Corporation v. Canada 
 
The chilling effects of the Metalclad decision were realized 
in Ethyl Corp. v. Canada. Ethyl Corporation is an American 
chemical company that produces the gasoline additive MMT
104
 
and was the sole supplier of MMT in Canada.
105
 In April 1997, 
Canada imposed a ban on the import and interprovincial 
transport of MMT, effectively eliminating MMT from Canadian 
gasoline.
106
 In passing the ban, the Canadian government cited 
its goals as tightening vehicle emissions standards, controlling 
air pollution, and preventing exposure of workers and drivers 
to airborne manganese particles via MMT.
107
 A majority of 
countries do not use MMT and several countries and states, 
 
 101. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., “INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION” 
AND THE “RIGHT TO REGULATE” IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 16 
(2004).  
 102. Stephen J. Byrnes, Balancing Investor Rights and Environmental 
Protection in Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under CAFTA: Lessons from 
the NAFTA Legitimacy Crisis, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. J. 103, 110–11 (2007). 
 103. Kass & McCarroll, supra note 90, at 3. 
 104. MMT stands for methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl. Id.  
 105. Michelle Sforza & Mark Valliantos, NAFTA & Environment Laws: 
Ethyl Corp. v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL POL’Y F. (APRIL 1997), 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212/45381.html.  
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  
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including California, have banned it.
108
 The same month that 
Canada implemented its ban on MMT, Ethyl Corporation filed 
a Chapter 11 investor-state claim against the Canadian 
government for $250 million in damages, citing indirect 
expropriation of its assets under Article 1110.
109
 After a NAFTA 
tribunal accepted jurisdiction over the claim, the Canadian 
government settled with Ethyl for $13 million, reversed its ban 
on MMT, and issued a public statement that “current scientific 
information” did not demonstrate MMT’s toxicity.
110
 
The outcome is evidence of Chapter 11’s direct effect on 
environmental legislation; the threat of a $250 million fallout 
was enough for the Canadian government to settle and drop the 
MMT ban.
111
 Although the health effects of MMT are still under 
debate,
112
 it would have been more logical to err on the side of 
caution in legislating and regulating products related to health 
and the environment. It also seems counter-intuitive that an 
American corporation could sue the Canadian government for a 
ban on MMT, but had no recourse in its own country against 
California’s ban. It is entirely possible that Canada may have 
defeated Ethyl’s claim, but the merits of the case were never 
decided. Metalclad gave the Canadian government enough 
reason to doubt its chances. 
 
c.Methanex Corporation v. California 
 
The outcomes of Metalclad and Ethyl Corp. gave 
environmentalists serious concerns about the increasing scope 
of investor-state claims, but in 1995 Methanex v. California 
helped relieve some of the worry. Methanex is the world’s 
largest producer of methanol, a chemical used to produce 
MTBE,
113
 a gasoline oxygenate designed to reduce harmful auto 
 
 108. Michael P. Walsh, The Global Experience with Lead in Gasoline and 
the Lessons We Should Apply to the Use of MMT, 50 AM. J. OF INDUS. MED. 
853, 853–60 (2007).  
 109. Sforza & Valliantos, supra note 105. 
 110. Ken Traynor, NAFTA and the Erosion of Federal Environmental 
Protection or, How NAFTA Became a Shill for Ethyl Corp., 23 INTERVENOR, 
JULY–SEPT. 1998, at 6. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Walsh, supra note 108, at 859 (adding that the $13 million settlement 
alone exceeded Canada’s budget for environmental enforcement and 
compliance programs).  
 113. MTBE stands for methyl tertiary-butyl ether. Methanex Corp. v. 
United States, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, 44 
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emissions.
114
 Studies indicate that MTBE causes significant 
water contamination and it has been associated with human 
neurotoxicological effects.
115
 Other studies show MTBE to be an 
animal carcinogen with the potential to cause cancer in 
humans.
116
 In March 1999, the governor of California issued an 
Executive Order requiring the phase-out of MTBE in the state’s 
gasoline by 2002 because of evidence that MTBE had 
contaminated drinking water wells and systems.
117
 At the time, 
17 states had banned MTBE or were in the process of 
restricting it.
118
  
In response to the ban, Methanex filed a Chapter 11 
investor-state claim against the California Executive Order 
seeking to either lift the ban or to be compensated $970 million 
for future lost profits.
119
 Methanex argued that the California 
Executive Order violated several provisions of NAFTA, 
including Article 1110, because the ban was tantamount to an 
expropriation of the company’s investment.
120
 In August 2005, 
after almost six years, the tribunal ruled to dismiss all claims, 
including the claim under Article 1110.
121
 In denying 
Methanex’s claim, the tribunal significantly limited the scope of 
the expropriation clause from its broad interpretation in 
Metalclad. The Panel stated that: 
 
[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which 
is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is 
not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless 
specific commitments had been given by the 
regulating government to the then putative foreign 
investor contemplating investment that the 
 
I.L.M. 1345, 1368 (2005) [hereinafter Methanex Final Award]. 
 114. Id.  
 115. Mary Bottari, NAFTA’s Investor “Rights:” A Corporate Dream, A 
Citizen Nightmare, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR MAG., Apr. 2001, at 10. 
 116. PUB. CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES: LESSONS 
FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 31 (2005), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTAReport_Final.pdf. 
 117. Methanex Final Award, supra note 113, at 1370.  
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. at 1345. 
 120. Id. at 1371. 
 121. Id. at 1462.  
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government would refrain from such regulation.
122
 
 
This decision signified a big victory for environmentalists; 
it held that non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose 
is not considered expropriation under NAFTA, and, therefore, 
governments are not required to compensate foreign 
investors.
123
 An exception still applies to situations like 
Metalcad, where the government made commitments to foreign 
investors that it would refrain from such regulation. Thus, the 
Methanex tribunal reconciled the Metalclad decision with its 
interpretation of the expropriation clause, thereby limiting the 
scope of Article 1110 and providing governments the legal 
standing to regulate environmental matters without breaking 
NAFTA rules.
124
 
While Methanex was an immediate victory for 
environmentalists, the deeper implications of investor-state 
claims could still impact a government’s ability to protect the 
environment in the future. Methanex suggests the undesirable 
scenario where foreign companies receive broad protection 
under the expropriation clause but domestic companies do not, 
thus creating an uneven playing field that encourages countries 
to drop environmental standards further.
125
 The concern 
remains that a claim against a state’s legitimate regulatory 
action could require the state to pay compensation to the 
claimant.
126
 These concerns, as well as the length and cost of 
arbitration, cause a chilling effect on public authorities, as seen 
in Ethyl Corp.
127
 Even worse, public authorities may choose not 
to enforce current regulations against foreign investors for fear 
of a Chapter 11 claim.
128
 Methanex lessens these fears to an 
 
 122. Id. at 1456. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 116, at 8.  
 126. See S.D. Myers v. Canada, Partial Award, Separate Opinion by Dr. 
Bryan Schwartz, at 86 (Nov. 12 2000), http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/disp-diff/myers-19.pdf.  
 127. PUB. CITIZEN, NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-TO-STATE CASES: 
BANKRUPTING DEMOCRACY vii (2001), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF186.PDF (“In the end, the government 
of Canada settled the case by revoking the ban . . . .”).  
 128. Id. (“[T]he potential for large multinational corporations to bully the 
government of the weakest and poorest countries of the hemisphere would be 
extraordinary. The mere threat of a vast damage award and high cost of 
defending a suit could make poorer nations concede before the fight had been 
joined . . . .”); See also Jack J. Coe, Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in 
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extent and to date very few claims have succeeded under 
Chapter 11,
129
 although large claims continue to be filed under 
NAFTA.
130
 While concerns under NAFTA remain, the United 
States has the ability to learn from past oversights in future 
trade agreements to better address environmental concerns.
131
 
 
2.Dominican Republic-Central America-Free Trade 
Agreement 
 
Based on the perceived economic success of NAFTA, the 
United States became a party to another multilateral FTA in 
2004, joining Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic in signing the 
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR).
132
 Based largely on the shortcomings of NAFTA, 
the agreement did not receive overwhelming support and only 
narrowly garnered majority support in both houses of 
Congress.
133
 Despite mixed support in Congress, the agreement 
represented a way to stimulate growth, foster stability, and lay 
the foundation for further cooperation in the region.
134
 
In drafting the new trade agreement, the United States 
realized the inherent weaknesses in NAFTA’s inadequate 
 
Its Tenth Year: An Interim Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1438 (2003) (“One understandable concern is 
that the specter of ruinous liability might restrain lawmakers from acting in 
the public interest.”). 
 129. See Coe, supra note 128. (“The staggering numbers accompanying the 
Chapter 11 prayers for relief, though making sensational headlines, are 
misleading . . . [a]pproximately fifteen Chapter 11 cases have come to a 
conclusion. Two have settled, five seem to have been abandoned . . . and eight 
have reached an adjudicated outcome. Only Metalclad and Myers have ended 
in awards of arguably significant compensation.”).  
 130. Ilana Solomon & Deb Nardone, Fracking Causes Friction Between 
Trade and Environment, SIERRA CLUB (Nov. 16, 2012), http://sierraclub. 
typepad.com/compass/2012/11/nafta-fracking-case.html (citing example of a 
$250 million claim by an American firm against Canada’s ban on fracking in 
November 2012).  
 131. PUB. CITIZEN, supra note 127, at 30 (“[T]he firm succeeded in a 
regulatory takings claim . . . sent alarm bells through national associations 
representing state and local officials and Congress. As a result . . . Congress 
instructed the USTR to ensure that future trade agreements would not permit 
this type of regulatory takings claim.”).  
 132. J. F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42468, THE DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC-CENTRAL AMERICA-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
(CAFTA-DR): DEVELOPMENTS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1 (2012).  
 133. The vote was 217 to 215. Id. 
 134. Id.  
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environmental protection. As a result, the United States made 
strengthening environmental provisions in CAFTA-DR a 
priority. The USTR even went so far as to promote CAFTA-DR 
as a significant improvement upon NAFTA.
135
 It endorsed 
CAFTA-DR as having “real teeth, including binding dispute 
settlement, monetary fines directed at solving problems, and 
potential trade sanctions,” as well as “[a] first-ever citizen 
participation process [that] will identify and find solutions for 
trade-related environmental problems.”
136
  
At first glance, CAFTA-DR seems to significantly improve 
upon NAFTA and includes many replications of NAFTA’s 
environmental provisions. Similar to NAFTA, CAFTA-DR 
contains many pro-environment provisions in Chapter 17, but 
is without any enforcement measures.
137
 CAFTA-DR 
encourages countries to strengthen environmental regulation 
at all levels, but it neither requires them to do so nor gives 
them incentives for such action.
138
 According to proponents of 
CAFTA-DR, its programs provide “assistance to over 340 
companies in cleaner production technologies that promote 
energy and water conservation and reductions in waste, raw 
material use, and emissions; and train more than 13,000 people 
in enforcement and implementation of environmental laws, 
public participation, and cleaner production practices.”
139
  
CAFTA-DR seems more like a promotional tool; true gains 
in environmental protection occur when countries are 
 
 135. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA FACTS (June 
2005), http://www.ustr.gov/archive/assets/Trade_Agreements/Regional/CAFTA 
/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file133_7801.pdf.  
 136. Id. 
 137. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States-Free Trade 
Agreement ch. 17, art. 17, Aug. 5, 2004, Hein’s No. KAV 7157 [hereinafter 
CAFTA-DR], available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text. 
 138. See id. at art. 17.1 (“Party shall ensure that its laws and policies 
provide for and encourage high levels of environmental protection, and shall 
strive to continue to improve those laws and policies.”); See also David A. 
Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement, 30 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 331, 403–
05 (2007) (“Given . . . the use of monetary assessments as an alternative to 
trade sanctions generally, and the only remedy for . . . environmental disputes, 
it is not surprising that there is a mechanism which provides for a review of 
the effectiveness of these provisions.”). 
 139. Rebecca Slocum, Promoting Trade and a Better Environment: CAFTA-
DR Environmental Cooperation, DIPNOTE, U.S. DEP’T OF ST. OFFICIAL BLOG 
(Feb. 21, 2011), http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2011/02/21/promoting-trade-and-
better-environment-cafta-dr-environmental-cooperation. 
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inherently committed to enacting and enforcing environmental 
protection legislation.
140
 Chapter 17 of CAFTA-DR contains a 
provision asserting that a country “shall not fail to effectively 
enforce its environmental laws.”
141
 If a country fails to 
effectively enforce its laws, a claim can be made by another 
country under Chapter 20, which deals with state-to-state 
disputes.
142
 However, Chapter 20 falls short, only punishing 
“sustained or reoccurring” instances of non-enforcement of 
environmental provisions; first-time offenders will not be 
punished.
143
  
Once the arbitration panel concludes that a country has 
failed to implement environmental regulations, trade sanctions 
are not an available remedy.
144
 The only remedy available is an 
assessment limited to $15 million to be paid into a fund for 
improving environmental enforcement provisions.
145
 
Consequently, if a country benefits by more than $15 million by 
not enforcing its environmental laws, it would have few 
practical incentives to do so, especially considering the lack of 
other trade sanctions or direct payment to said country.
146
  
CAFTA-DR members also lack the incentive to file a Chapter 
20 claim given the high threshold for state-to-state claims.
147
 
The high threshold, combined with the small monetary remedy 
if successful, makes it unlikely any state would risk alienating 
the offending state to pursue a claim. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
there has only been one state-to-state claim pursuant to 
Chapter 20 since CAFTA-DR’s inception, unrelated to the 
environment.
148
  
CAFTA-DR has, however, improved upon NAFTA in two 
major areas related to investor-state claims. First, the drafters 
of CAFTA-DR corrected the overall lack of transparency in the 
arbitration process that was rightfully criticized by 
environmentalists and legal scholars.
149
 To make the dispute 
 
 140. See Generally Gantz, supra note 138 (arguing that the enforcement 
provision of Chapter 20 is burdensome and of questionable effectiveness). 
 141. CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at art. 17.2.1.  
 142. See id. at art. 20.  
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at art. 20.17. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Gantz, supra note 138, at 404. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  
 149. See CHRISTIAN LEATHLEY, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
LATIN AMERICA: AN INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW 230-40 (2007) (providing an 
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resolution process more transparent, the drafters made many 
critical changes.
150
 For example, CAFTA-DR requires that all 
major documents involving investor-state claims be made 
public
151
 and allows the court to consider amicus curiae briefs 
from
 
third parties. Disputing parties may review the proposed 
decision or award and submit written comments within 60 days 
for the tribunal to consider.
152
 The tribunal may award costs 
and attorneys’ fees if it considers the claim or the respondent’s 
objection “frivolous.”
153
 These provisions improve NAFTA by 
providing more oversight, more participation by interested
 
third parties, and more public awareness. 
Second, CAFTA-DR heavily improved upon its predecessor 
NAFTA by limiting the types of investor-state claims. While 
CAFTA-DR’s Chapter 10 on Investment is nearly identical to 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11, it includes a significant addition in its 
Annex.
154
 Annex 10-C addresses expropriation by further 
defining and narrowing an investor’s ability to recover due to 
indirect expropriation. There are two types of expropriation: 
direct and indirect. Direct expropriation occurs when an 
investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated 
through formal transfer of title or outright seizure. Indirect 
expropriation occurs when an action or series of actions by a 
party has an effect equivalent to direct expropriation, but 
without formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
155
 To 
determine whether there has been an indirect expropriation, 
several factors are considered: (1) the economic impact of the 
government action, (2) the extent to which the government 
action interferes with distinct, reasonable investment-backed 
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.
156
 
Annex 10-C adds, “except in rare circumstances, 
nondiscriminatory regulatory actions designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
 
overview of the NAFTA’s blunders which CAFTA-DR attempted to rectify or 
avoid). 
 150. CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at art. 10.7.1.; LEATHLEY, supra note 149, 
at 232 (“[I]nvestors under the US-CAFTA-DR can expect certain information 
to be made public . . . .”). 
 151. CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at art. 10.7.1. 
 152. Id. at arts.10.20.3, 9. 
 153. Id. at art. 10.20.6. 
 154. Id. at Annex 10. 
 155. Id. at Annex 10-C.  
 156. Id. at Annex 10-C(4)(a).  
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expropriations.”
157
 Annex 10-C does not give examples of what 
those “rare circumstances” might be. However, by narrowly 
defining expropriation and clearly delineating the types of 
disputes the provision applies to, the drafters created a more 
effective rule to follow. Parties now have a stronger foundation 
for holding environmental regulation claims to a higher 
standard. 
Thus far, redefining expropriation has had a seemingly 
positive effect on curbing state-investor disputes over 
environmental public welfare objectives. Only one claim has 
been filed since CAFTA-DR’s inception in 2004, and the claim 
was ultimately dismissed under the expropriation clause in 
Article 10.7.
158
 While an arbitral interpretation of expropriation 
under CAFTA-DR’s definition would be beneficial, the lack of 
claims filed is a sign that environmental actions and 
regulations have more protection under CAFTA-DR than 
NAFTA. 
 
IV. THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 
 
Despite the poor environmental record of the United States 
on prior FTAs, there have been some indications that the TPP 
will include strong environmental protection provisions. At the 
2008 Democratic National Convention, Barack Obama’s party 
pledged to “not negotiate bilateral trade agreements that stop 
the government from protecting the environment.”
159
 In 2012, 
the USTR spokesperson, Nkenge Harmon, provided a 
statement on the Obama administration’s position: 
 
[The Obama] administration is committed to ensuring 
strong environmental . . . laws. Nothing in our TPP 
investment proposal could impair our government’s 
ability to pursue legitimate, non-discriminatory public 
interest regulation, including measures to protect . . . 
 
 157. Id. 
 158. Pac Rim Cayman, LLC v. El Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, 
Decision on the Respondent’s Jurisdictional Objections, ¶ 1.10 (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0935.pdf.  
 159. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L CONVENTION COMM., RENEWING AMERICA’S 
PROMISE (2008) (Presented to the 2008 Democratic National Convention by 
the Platform Standing Committee), available at 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2011/01 
/2008DemocraticPlatformbyCmte_08-13-08.pdf. 
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the environment.
160
  
 
In August 2010, USTR officials announced that all TPP 
participants, despite differences in levels of development, would 
be required to meet the same labor and environmental 
conditions;
161
 USTR official, Mark Linscott, stated that an 
“environment chapter in the TPP should strengthen countries’ 
commitments to enforce their environmental laws and 
regulations, including areas related to ocean and fisheries 
governance, through the effective enforcement obligation 
subject to dispute settlement.”
162
 
Other negotiating members of the TPP have shown their 
commitment to protecting the environment as well. The 
original four TPP members included an Environmental 
Cooperation Agreement in the original trade agreement, which 
outlined the parties’ commitment to a high level of 
environmental protection.
163
 In addition, Australia’s 
government has stated it  
 
[D]oes not support provisions that would confer 
greater legal rights on foreign businesses than those 
available to domestic businesses. Nor will the 
Government support provisions that would constrain 
the ability of Australian governments to make laws 
on . . . environmental . . . matters in circumstances 
where those laws do not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign businesses.
164
  
 
 160. Zach Carter, Obama Trade Document Leaked, Revealing New 
Corporate Powers and Broken Campaign Promises, HUFFINGTON POST (June 
13, 2012, 9:17AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/13/obama-trade-document-
leak_n_1592593.html. 
 161. Amy Tsui, Labor, Environmental Standards to be Same Across all 
Eight TPP Countries, 27 INT’L TRADE REP. 1261 (2010). 
 162. Marine Wealth: Promoting Conservation and Advancing American 
Exports: Hearing before the S. Subcomm. on Int’l Trade, Customs and Global 
Competitiveness, 111th Cong. (2010) (written testimony of Mark Linscott, 
Assistant U.S. Trade Rep. for Env’t and Natural Res.), available at 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/071410mltest.pdf. 
 163. See Environment Cooperation Agreement Among the Parties to the 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, NEW ZEALAND 
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz 
/downloads/trade-agreement/transpacific/environment-agreement.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
 164. AUSTRALIAN GOV’T, DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, GUILLARD 
GOVERNMENT TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS 
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The United States has also supported the reduction of 
tariffs on environmental goods,
165
 while New Zealand and Chile 
reportedly have tabled trade and climate change submissions.
166
  
There is, however, cause for concern that the TPP will not 
adequately protect environmental interests. It is not an easy 
task getting eleven or more countries to agree on any type of 
international law, but environmental provisions are an 
especially difficult topic. Accordingly, the environmental 
chapter has emerged as one of the most challenging areas of 
the negotiations.
167
 Developing nations are the most concerned 
with including environmental provisions, as they would be at a 
disadvantage if they must adhere to the same standards as 
developed nations.
168
 Enforcement is also a major issue as 
several parties do not want to make environmental obligations 
binding under the TPP dispute settlement mechanism as the 
United States has proposed.
169
 Even though New Zealand has 
proposed including climate change provisions in the TPP, its 
support has been limited to a non-binding affirmation of the 
benefit of pricing carbon.
170
 It remains uncertain how hard the 
United States will push for strict environmental provisions 
where it may conflict with its other interests regarding drafting 
of the TPP.  
Chinese scholars believe that successful implementation of 
the TPP will have a negative economic and geopolitical impact 
on China “as a force that could rip apart the regional economic 
integration of East Asia.”
171
 This has led many people to 
 
AND PROSPERITY 14 (April, 2011) available at 
http://pdf.aigroup.asn.au/trade/Gillard%20Trade%20Policy%20Statement.pdf.  
 165. U.S. Pushes Conservation Initiatives for Proposed Trans-Pacific Pact, 
INT’L CENTRE FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Dec. 7, 2011), 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/121000/. 
 166. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012). 
 167. Key Areas Of TPP Talks At Different Stages After 30 Months Of Effort, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE’S WORLD TRADE ONLINE (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http://insidetrade.com/Inside-Trade-General/Public-Content-World-Trade-
Online/key-areas-of-tpp-talks-at-different-stages-after-30-months-of-
effort/menu-id-896.html. 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. 
 171. Guoyou Song & Wen Jin Yuan, China’s Free Trade Agreement 
Strategies, WASH. Q. (Fall 2012), available at http://csis.org/files 
/publication/twq12FallSongYuan.pdf; Jianmin Jin, China’s Concerns 
Regarding TPP No More than Empty Worries?, FUJITSU RES. INST. (Jan. 11, 
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speculate, including members of the press in China, that the 
United States is using the TPP to marginalize China’s 
influence in Asia.
172
 During the 2012 presidential debates, 
President Obama said, “we’re organizing trade relations with 
countries other than China so that China starts feeling more 
pressure about meeting basic international standards.”
173
 
Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton indicated that China 
has an open invitation to join TPP talks.
174
 However, there is no 
evidence that China would have any additional influence over 
the terms of the TPP. With the current concerns over China’s 
growing economic influence, the United States may be using 
the TPP to force China either to “meet basic international 
standards” or else risk substantial trade losses to countries in 
their own region. If this truly is the main priority of the TPP 
from the American perspective, environmental provisions could 
be threatened with elimination if they become too controversial. 
Many believe that China’s undervalued currency is a mounting 
foreign policy concern that may take precedence over 
international environmental goals.
175
 
Another part of the concern stems from the intense secrecy 
that has surrounded the TPP negotiations. Even though 
negotiations have been ongoing since 2008, the negotiating 
partners have not been willing to offer any details of the trade 
documents or drafts.
176
 While 600 representatives of 
corporations have access to draft versions of the TPP, they are 
restricted from sharing the information with the public.
177
  
The lack of transparency is especially alarming considering 
the Obama administration is expected to ask Congress for 
 
2012), http://jp.fujitsu.com/group/fri/en/column/message/2012/2012-01-11.html. 
 172. Song & Yuan, supra note 171; Jin, supra note 171. 
 173. Tom Miles, US-led US-Asian Pact Spurs China's Asian Trade Bloc, 
S.Korea Minister Says, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2012, 6:12 AM), http://in.reuters.com 
/article/2012/11/06/trade-china-bloc-idINDEE8A500A20121106. 
 174. Clinton: China Welcome in TPP, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 17, 2012,  
http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/321762/clinton-welcomes-china-to-
join-trade-pact. 
 175. Chad Karnes, What Does China's 'Currency Manipulation' mean for 
the Dollar?, YAHOO! FINANCE (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/does-chinas-currency-manipulation-mean-
220039282.html. 
 176. Mike Delrio, Secrecy Surrounding Trade Talks Reflects Obama 
Administration Transparency, EXAMINER.COM (June 25, 2012), 
http://www.examiner.com/article/secrecy-surrounding-trade-talks-reflects-
obama-adminstration-transparency. 
 177. Id. 
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Trade Promotion Authority,
178
 which would give the President 
the authority to negotiate international agreements that 
Congress can approve or disapprove but not amend.
179
 Congress 
created the power of trade promotion authority in the Trade 
Act of 1974.
180
 The power created by this act would allow the 
President to sign the TPP before a Congressional vote and 
imposes rules on Congress that limit debate and prevent 
amendments, resulting in a straight up or down vote on the 
TPP.
181
 Ron Kirk, USTR from March 18, 2009 to March 15, 
2013, was remarkably forthright in revealing his opposition to 
making the text public: “doing so, he suggested to Reuters, 
would raise such opposition that it could make the deal 
impossible to sign.”
182
 
Such an approach to the adoption of an FTA, where 
Congress and citizens have negligible input in the negotiations, 
could put Congress in a tough position. Forcing an up or down 
vote on the text of the TPP requires Congress to choose 
between the status quo and whatever agreement to which the 
President and the TPP member countries agree. Absent Trade 
Promotion Authority, Congress would have the ability to 
amend any provisions of the TPP; however, the vast number of 
countries involved, combined with the number of years it has 
taken to negotiate, essentially dictates that member countries 
be prevented from proposing amendments after the agreement 
is finalized. Bearing this in mind, it makes it more imperative 
that members of Congress have input in the TPP while it is still 
being negotiated in order to increase the chances that tough 
environmental provisions are included.  
 
 178. Id. 
 179. CAROLYN C. SMITH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21004, TRADE 
PROMOTION AUTHORITY AND FAST-TRACK 
NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY FOR TRADE AGREEMENTS: MAJOR VOTES (2011). If 
the President transmits a trade agreement to Congress, then the majority 
leaders of the House and Senate or their designees must introduce the 
implementing bill submitted by the President on the first day on which their 
House is in session. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(c)(1) (2006). Senators and 
Representatives may not amend the President’s bill, either in committee or in 
the Senate or House. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d). The committees to which the bill has 
been referred have 45 days after its introduction to report the bill, or be 
automatically discharged, and each House must vote within 15 days after the 
bill is reported or discharged. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(1). 
 180. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191–2194. 
 181. Lori Wallach & Ben Beachy, Obama’s Covert Trade Deal, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 2, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/03/opinion/obamas-covert-
trade-deal.html?_r=0. 
 182. Id. 
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If the secrecy was not enough to cause concern, a portion of 
the TPP draft was leaked in June 2012.
183
 That draft contained 
the TPP’s investment chapter, a section that reveals that TPP 
negotiators are considering a dispute resolution process that 
would grant transnational corporations special authority to 
challenge countries’ laws, regulations and court decisions in 
international tribunals that circumvent domestic judicial 
systems.
184
 Environmentalists fear implementation of such a 
program would repeat the mistakes of NAFTA and CAFTA-
DR.
185
 Article 12.12, the proposed draft of TPP’s language on 
investor rights, contains almost identical language on investor 
rights as that of CAFTA-DR while the investor-state disputes 
have the same arbitration procedures.
186
 The investment 
chapter did contain Annex 12-D, however, which goes even 
further in limiting the scope of investor-state disputes than 
CAFTA-DR, which states that: 
 
In order to constitute indirect expropriation, the 
state’s deprivation of the investor’s property must be 
[either] severe or for an indefinite period [and] 
disproportionate to the public purpose. A deprivation 
of property shall be particularly likely to constitute 
indirect expropriation where it is discriminatory in its 
effect, either as against the particular investor or 
against a class of which the investor forms part; or in 
breach of the state’s prior binding written 
commitment to the investor, whether by contract, 
license or other legal document.
187
 
 
Article 12.15 also states: 
 
 
 183. See generally TPP Draft Text On Investment Reveals Debate on 
Capital Controls, INSIDE U.S. TRADE NEWSSTAND, June 15, 2012, at 1, 25-26 
(providing commentary on the leaked draft of the Trans-Pacific Partnership). 
 184. Llana Solomon, NAFTA on Steroids: What it Could Mean for the 
Environment, HUFFINGTON POST, July 16, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ilana-solomon/nafta-on-steroids_b_1670748 
.html. 
 185. See id. (discussing the concerns of environmental groups). 
 186. Compare Newly Leaked TPP Investment Chapter Contains Special 
Rights for Corporations, CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/tppinvestment. 
pdf. (providing relevant text on investor rights), with CAFTA-DR, supra note 
137, at art. 10.1-10.31 (providing relevant text on investor rights). 
 187. CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, supra note 186, at Annex 12-D.  
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1. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to 
prevent a Party from adopting, maintaining or 
enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with 
this Chapter that it considers appropriate to 
ensure that investment activity in its territory is 
undertaken in a manner sensitive to 
environmental. . .[concerns] False 
2. The Parties recognise that it is inappropriate to 
encourage investment by relaxing its health safety 
or environmental measures . . . .
188
  
 
These improvements to the investment chapter should help 
ensure that investors are not able to subvert government 
attempts to enforce and enact environmental regulations. 
In addition to these provisions, the United States’ 
environment proposal tabled in September 2011 contains three 
main components that may be included in the TPP.
189
 The main 
components are: conservation, core commitments, and public 
participation.
190
 The conservation component focuses on illegal 
logging, marine fisheries, endangered species, and prevention 
of illegal trade in plants and wildlife while the core 
commitments component would require parties to uphold their 
commitments to any of the multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEA) they have signed.
191
 The public participation 
component would allow stakeholders the ability to challenge a 
member state’s adherence to the provisions.
192
 While the 
current and proposed provisions might seem like victories for 
environmental advocates, there are still no observable 
enforcement measures to ensure their compliance and similar 
versions of these provisions are found in both NAFTA and 
CAFTA-DR.
193
 The United States’ proposal is also lacking any 
provisions directly aimed at reducing the emissions of GHGs.
194
  
 
 188. Id.  
 189. See IAN F. FERGUSSON & BRUCE VAUGHN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT 15 (2012). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Compare CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, supra note 186, at 14, with 
NAFTA, supra note 80, at 642 (providing relevant NAFTA text on investment 
and the environment), and CAFTA-DR, supra note 137, at 10.8 (providing 
relevant CAFTA-DR text on investment and the environment). 
 194. USTR Green Paper on Conservation and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
VINCENT Article 2/27/2014  5:59 PM 
2014] THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP 29 
 
If these remain the only environmental provisions 
contained in the TPP, then it becomes increasingly likely the 
TPP will merely be an extension of NAFTA’s and CAFTA-DR’s 
shortcomings when it comes to actively promoting and 
enforcing environmental provisions. The TPP could become the 
largest FTA in history,
195
 representing a golden opportunity to 
promote the type of tangible environmental sustainability that 
was absent from NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. Enforcement 
measures are likely the most challenging and controversial 
aspect to environmental provisions in the TPP, so there is still 
likely to be significant negotiations on those measures before 
their inclusion in the draft. However, it is concerning that there 
currently is no evidence of basic agreements on enforcement 
measures between TPP members.  
 
A. ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS 
 
While any increase in trade and production has potential 
environmental impacts, the TPP would particularly affect 
several specific environmental areas due to the current state of 
socioeconomic affairs of its potential members. One such area, 
anthropogenic climate change, is a widely recognized global 
problem.
196
 According to the International Energy Agency, 
trends indicate that “delaying action is a false economy” and 
that the opportunity cost of preventative action today is less 
than twenty percent of what would be required after 2020.
197
 A 
November 2012 World Bank report predicts that the world 
 
THE PRESIDENT, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/fact-sheets/2011 
/ustr-green-paper-conservation-and-trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Oct. 
5, 2013). 
 195. See generally What is the Trans-Pacific Partnership? CBC NEWS (June 
20, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/what-is-the-trans-pacific-
partnership-1.1147888 (providing information on the scope of the TPP). 
 196. Global Warming Seen as a Major Problem Around the World Less 
Concern in the U.S., China and Russia, PEW RES. CENTER (Dec. 2, 2009), 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/12/02/global-warming-seen-as-a-major-
problem-around-the-world-less-concern-in-the-us-china-and-russia/ (discussing 
the consensus on climate change as a global problem); see also Kristin 
Eberhard, New Poll: Americans Believe Global Warming is Real and Threatens 
Their Families, SWITCHBOARD NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL STAFF BLOG 
(Oct. 24, 2012), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/kgrenfell/new_poll_ 
americans_believe_glo.html (discussing Americans’ views on climate change). 
 197. Brad Plumer, When Do We Hit the Point of No Return for Climate 
Change?, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2011, 10:36 AM, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/when-do-we-hit-the-
point-of-no-return-for-climate-change/2011/11/10/gIQA4rri8M_blog.html. 
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temperature will increase by as much as four degrees Celsius 
by 2100 if GHGs continue to rise at current rates.
198
 This past 
century has already seen a 0.8 degrees Celsius increase, and 
while governments have vowed to make efforts to limit the 
increase to only two degrees Celsius, the authors of the report 
do not believe the proposed global efforts, if enacted, will be 
effective enough to meet their goal.
199
 A broad consensus exists 
for the proposition that a global mean temperature increase 
greater than two degrees Celsius will result in increasingly 
costly adaptation and considerable impacts that exceed the 
adaptive capacity of many systems and an increasing and 
unacceptably high risk of large-scale irreversible effects.
200
  
NAFTA’s members
201
, Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States, represent some of the worst offenders for GHG 
emissions. The three North American countries are among the 
top fifteen countries in terms of GHG emissions; in 2009, the 
United States alone accounted for 18.9 percent of the world’s 
emissions.
202
 From 1990 to 2005, GHG emissions increased at 
an alarming rate, with increases of 17, 26, and 37 percent in 
the United States, Canada, and Mexico, respectively.
203
 While 
emissions from Asian countries, excluding China and India, are 
not nearly as large as North American countries, their 
emerging economies are expected to produce a very large 
increase in GHGs over the next few decades.
204
 
 
 198. Wendy Koch, World Bank: Climate Change Could Cause Massive 
Damage, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news 
/nation/2012/11/19/world-bank-warns-climate-change/1715165/. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See generally The 2°C Target Information Reference Document of the 
EU Climate Change Expert Group ‘EG Science,’ at 3 (July 9, 2008), available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/future/docs 
/brochure_2c_en.pdf (discussing the possible negative impacts of a two degree 
temperature increase and methods for preventing such outcomes).  
 201. “The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a regional 
agreement between the Government of Canada, the Government of the United 
Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America to 
implement a free trade area.” Frequently Asked Questions, NAFTA 
SECRETARIAT, https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid 
=113&language=en-US (last visited Oct. 23, 2013). 
 202. Simon Rogers & Lisa Evans, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by 
Country: China Speeds Ahead of the Rest, THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 31, 2011, 2:20 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/31/world-carbon-
dioxide-emissions-country-data-co2. 
 203. Jeffrey J. Schott & Meera Fickling, Setting the NAFTA Agenda on 
Climate Change, 2009 PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. 1. 
 204. Ross Toro, Greenhouse Gases: The Biggest Emitters (Infographic), 
LIVESCIENCE (Aug. 26, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.livescience.com/15715-
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Climate change is an environmental concern of the TPP 
because of the increases in GHGs resulting from trade 
liberalization. FTAs usually result in the increase of exports, 
which requires increases in production and transportation. 
According to one study, trade liberalization leads to an 
expected increase in exports of 3.36 percent per year, which 
coincides with an increase of 3.4 percent in transport emissions 
and 4.3 percent in output related emissions per year.
205
 
Numerous econometric studies have found similarly large 
positive correlations between instances of trade liberalizing and 
GHG emissions.
206
 Considering that the TPP covers members 
that are separated by the Pacific Ocean, the increase in 
transport related emissions could be especially significant as 33 
percent of trade-related emissions come from international 
transport.
207
  
Many countries have shown their commitment to reducing 
GHGs through international agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol.
208
 As a trade agreement without any offsetting GHG 
provisions will negatively contribute to the increasingly dire 
climate situation, countries that are concerned about the 
environment will want to take into consideration the inevitable 
effects that the TPP will have on climate change.  
Another environmental concern of the implementation of 
the TPP is the impact it could have on fishing. The United 
States, Vietnam, Canada, and Chile are among the top fifteen 
exporters of fish in the world.
209
 Overfishing is an ever-
 
greenhouse-gases.html. 
 205. Misak Avetisyan et al., Trade and the Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
International Freight Transport 4 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
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operation & Dev., Domestic and International Environmental Impacts of 
Agricultural Trade Liberalisation, COM/AGR/ENV(2000)75/FINAL (Vol. VIII, 
n.90), (2000); Michael J. Ferrantino & Linda A. Linkins, The Effect of Global 
Trade Liberalization on Toxic Emissions in Industry (Office of Econ. U.S. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, Working Paper No. 96-11-A, rev. 1998), available at 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/docs/pubs/research_working_papers/ec9611a
.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GLOBALISATION, TRANSPORT AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT (Publication Brief, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org 
/env/transportandenvironment/45095528.pdf. 
 207. Cristea et al., supra note 205, at 154. 
 208. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol 
/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2013). 
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increasing concern as “one half of the global marine catch is 
designated as fully exploited, one quarter as over exploited or 
depleted, and the other quarter as underexploited but 
composed mainly of low-value species.”
210
 This problem is not 
strictly a conservational one, as “losses to the global economy 
from the unsustainable exploitation of marine resources exceed 
$50 billion annually.”
211
 While relaxed restrictions on fishing 
contribute to overfishing, fishing subsidies, which are 
estimated to total $16 billion worldwide each year, are a more 
immediate concern as governments are actively promoting 
overfishing.
212
 The TPP’s potential to curb such subsidies or 
mitigate the potential for overfishing is another environmental 
aspect that should not go unnoticed in negotiations between 
member countries. 
Wildlife conservation and illegal logging are additional 
environmental concerns that could be addressed through the 
TPP as member countries contain primary trading routes for 
some of the world’s greatest concentrations of biological 
diversity in animal and plant species.
213
 Illegal trade in wildlife 
endangers species, destroys wildlife, and can cause the spread 
of disease as well as the undesirable effects of organized 
crime.
214
 Worldwide, illegal trade in wildlife generates between 
ten to twenty billion dollars annually, and is especially 
prevalent in TPP members countries such as Peru, Chile, and 
those in Southeast Asia.
215
 Illegal logging is another problem in 
TPP countries.
216
 Illegal logging contributes to forest 
degradation and accounts for five to ten percent of global 
timber production, with annual losses of public assets in 
developing countries estimated at roughly ten billion dollars.
217
 
The United States is one of the world’s largest timber product 
 
THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP: A QUEST FOR A TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY 
TRADE AGREEMENT 187, 193 (C. L. Lim et al. eds., 2012). 
 210. Id. at 191 (citing WORLD BANK & FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., THE SUNKEN 
BILLIONS: THE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR FISHERIES REFORM (2009)). 
 211. Id. at 193.  
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 194–95. 
 214. Id. at 194. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. at 195–96 (describing illegal logging as logging in protected areas 
or areas of endangered species of trees, without the necessary permits).  
 217. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Arnoldo 
Contreras-Hermosilla et al., The Economics of Illegal Logging and Associated 
Trade, at 4, 17, OECD Doc. SG/SD/RT(2007)1/REV (Jan. 8, 2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/43/39348796.pdf. 
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consumers and top importers of tropical hardwoods, a 
significant portion of which is illegally logged.
218
 Peru is one 
source of illegally logged timber, while Malaysia and Vietnam 
engage in smuggling and laundering of illegally logged timber 
and products.
219
 
The TPP presents an opportunity to address worsening 
environmental trends.
220
 Climate change, overfishing, and 
illegal logging have negative economic effects and could cause 
even greater problems in the future if not dealt with as soon as 
possible.
221
 Environmental sustainability is extremely 
important for the continuing prosperity and growth to which 
the global economy is accustomed.
222
  
 
B. WHY INCLUDE ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS? 
 
Inserting environment provisions into trade agreements is 
not the only way countries implement environmental 
agreements; however, it may be the most effective way of 
enforcing them. It is estimated that “[w]orld leaders have 
signed up to an impressive 500 internationally recognized 
environmental agreements in the past 50 years . . . .”
223
 Today 
there are over 250 multilateral environmental agreements in 
effect.
224
 Environmental protection has become such a big issue 
that it is now the second most common area of global rule-
making behind only trade.
225
 Despite the progress made over 
the last couple of decades in actively promoting environmental 
protection, there remains a lack of substantial change. Even 
the promising “Rio+20,” a 2012 international conference on 
sustainable development, attended by more than 130 heads of 
state with government official from 192 countries, resulted in 
only a forty-nine page nonbinding document which renewed 
participants’ commitment to sustainable development and 
 
 218. Id.  
 219. Schott & Muir, supra note 209, at 196. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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 223. John Vidal, Many Treaties to Save The Earth, But Where's the Will to 
Implement Them?, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com 
/environment/blog/2012/jun/07/earth-treaties-environmental-agreements. 
 224. The Doha Mandate on Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e 
/envir_neg_mea_e.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2013). 
 225. Vidal, supra note 223. 
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promotion of an economically and environmentally sustainable 
future.
226
 The conference was on par with previous efforts to 
promote a sustainable environment but, as usual, resulted in 
mostly hollow promises. 
The problem with these environmental efforts is that 
international law of any kind is inherently weak due to the 
sovereignty each country possesses.
227
 International 
environmental law runs into the tragedy of the commons 
dilemma where countries acting independently and rationally 
according to their own self-interest will pollute and deplete the 
environment despite knowing that doing so is contrary to their 
long-term best interests.
228
 Even if countries attempt to avoid 
this dilemma through treaties or other agreements, free-riding 
becomes an issue, as countries that decide not to join 
environmental agreements still reap the benefits of those 
agreements without paying the costs.
229
 Therefore, any agreed 
upon environmental provisions are likely to be inadequate.  
Furthermore, enforcement of these laws is an enormous 
problem. The competing capitalist nature of nations encourages 
the limited enforcement of any type of international law that 
would negatively affect GDP. Because environmental law poses 
a direct threat to short terms gains of countries, many nations 
are unwilling to enforce it absent any incentives or enforcement 
measures.
230
 If a country fails to adhere to environmental law, 
there must be consequences in order for the law to have any 
substantial impact. Yet, if the consequences are too harsh 
countries will not engage in environmental agreements at all.  
For example, the Kyoto Protocol was organized to create 
binding obligations on industrialized countries to reduce their 
GHG emissions. It was signed but never ratified by the United 
States and was withdrawn from by Canada.
231
 There were 
 
 226. United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development RIO+20, Rio 
de Janiero, Braz., June 20-22, 2012, The Future We Want, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.216/L.1. 
 227. See generally STEFAN TALMON, RECOGNITION OF GOVERNMENTS IN 
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EXILE 50 (1998) (discussing the legal concept of sovereignty). 
 228. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 
SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (describing the tragedy of the commons). 
 229. See generally RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF 
EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS AND CLUB GOODS (1986) (discussing the free 
rider problem). 
 230. See generally Schott & Muir, supra note 209 (discussing the links 
between economies and environmental protection). 
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certain provisions in the Protocol with which the United States 
Congress disagreed and to which they declined to adhere.
232
 
This is not the first time the United States has signed but 
failed to ratify a treaty.
233
 There are currently ten treaties that 
the United States has signed but not ratified that would 
improve global environmental protection.
234
 With all the factors 
working against strong and effective environmental 
agreements, any opportunity for countries to enact effective 
environmental laws should be taken. Therefore, it is imperative 
that the TPP contain strong environmental provisions.  
The international power of sovereign states renders it 
exceptionally difficult for a government of intergovernmental 
organization to impose its will upon a separate sovereign.
235
 
Trade sanctions are one of the few options at a country’s 
disposal that directly affect another country.
236
 This is why the 
current draft of the TPP contains at least twenty-six chapters, 
many of which deal with diverse areas of trade such as 
intellectual property rights, foreign investment, labor, and the 
environment.
237
 These topics are covered because trade between 
countries is more complex than just tariffs and quotas. The 
laws that govern a country’s labor practices, copyrights, 
patents, investment, and consumer and environmental 
protection all affect the price of goods and services.
238
 Without 
laws governing areas such as these, goods and services could be 
provided at a much cheaper cost.
239
 At the local level, many 
governments realize that the added cost is worth the benefits 
and protection that these laws provide.
240
 Internationally, 
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RECLAIMING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP: WHY THE UNITED STATES 
SHOULD RATIFY TEN PENDING ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES 2–4 (White Paper 
No. 1201, Jan. 2012), available at http://www.progressivereform.org 
/articles/International_Environmental_Treaties_1201.pdf. 
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R40502, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (2012). 
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THEORY AND POLICY (Addison-Wesley 2009) (1988). 
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however, it is much harder to get countries to agree to 
international standards because of the increasingly competitive 
and diverse nature of the globalized world.
241
 Connecting these 
areas of law to trade agreements, therefore, is the only true 
way to make them effective in order to provide real 
consequences for those who do not adhere to an agreement 
while still creating incentives for countries to join the 
agreement. FTAs need to internalize the costs that free trade 
has on the environment in order to promote both an 
environmentally and economically sustainable future.
242
  
 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL PROVISIONS FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE 
 
The first step towards ensuring that the TPP adequately 
promotes environmental interests is eliminating the secrecy of 
the document and negotiations. Negotiation drafts of the TPP 
should be made available to Congress and the public. In June 
2012, four senators sent a letter to the Obama administration 
asking for greater congressional access to negotiations on the 
TPP.
243
 In August, Representative Walter Jones introduced a 
resolution in the House of Representatives that would require 
Congress to be allowed to observe TPP negotiations.
244
 Then, in 
October, ten senators said that a strong environment chapter in 
the TPP would be critical to their support.
245
 It is apparent that 
there is a growing concern in Congress over the secrecy of the 
TPP. Congress has the ultimate say in whether the United 
States accepts the finalized version of the TPP. If more 
members of Congress continue to demand strong environment 
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 242. See generally David P. Vincent, Internalizing Externalities: An 
Economic and Legal Analysis of an International Carbon Tax Regime, 92 OR. 
L. REV. 163, 164 (2013) (addressing the costs of environmental externalities 
and the possibilities present within the current international trade regime for 
enhancing economic welfare by liberalizing world trade and mitigating climate 
change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions). 
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th
 Cong. (2012). 
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provisions and require transparency in the negotiations in 
order for the TPP to receive their support, they will force the 
Obama administration to take them seriously or risk wasting 
years on an FTA that has no chance of passing.  
Another improvement that should be made in the TPP 
concerns the dispute resolution system. The arbitration model 
used in NAFTA and CAFTA-DR needs to be changed because it 
is not living up to its goal of creating a unity of expectations for 
the parties involved in Chapter 11 disputes.
246
 The current 
system’s use of a non-consistent group of arbitrators does not 
adequately protect environmental interests; it lacks consistency 
and accountability, which makes it difficult for parties to know 
what the law is or what to expect if certain claims are resolved 
through arbitration. While CAFTA-DR’s additional language on 
expropriation was beneficial in correcting NAFTA’s mistakes, 
there is no guarantee that arbitrators will interpret other parts 
of the TPP in ways the drafters intended. Establishing a 
permanent international court system, resembling current 
American courts, to oversee TPP environmental disputes could 
be one solution. Ideally, one judge with a background in 
environmental law could be appointed from each member 
nation. A five-judge panel would hear disputes that arise, 
making sure to exclude any judges appointed from a member 
nation in the dispute. Such a system would provide much 
greater consistency. There would be a regular group of judges 
who have experience in the type of law they are ruling on. They 
would be held more accountable for inconsistent decisions, 
giving decisions a greater precedential effect.  
The TPP also needs to include concrete standards on 
environmental sustainability that member countries must 
achieve. The initial plan of the United States to incorporate the 
same environmental standards for all TPP members is not fair 
or rational, based on varying degrees of development.
247
 
Provisions such as emission standards and polluting 
regulations that are tailored to the size and development of 
member countries would be a fairer approach and more likely 
to receive approval. Standards that gradually change over 
many years would be the most effective approach, as countries 
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would have the opportunity to improve their environmental 
impact. Considering the amount of environmental treaties 
currently in effect, the TPP should adopt many of the 
environmental standards from popular treaties but add the 
enforcement mechanism that current treaties lack. The Kyoto 
Protocol was a good starting point to raise awareness of climate 
change, but it failed to address a number of core issues, such as 
“setting targets based on a fair and efficient burden-sharing 
principle, effectively engaging developing countries, setting a 
long-term goal, implementing cost-effective policy instruments 
with given binding target, [and] non-compliance 
penalties . . .”
248
 Under the TPP, developed countries could 
adopt standards on GHGs that require members to decrease 
emissions each year. The largest emitters would be required to 
decrease their emissions the most and prevent their emissions 
from increasing by more than five percent a year until they 
reached a designated level of emissions under which they 
would be required to remain. Those that violate the standards 
would be taxed on the amount of emissions that exceeded their 
limit and would fund programs designed to promote greener 
production.  
Another provision the TPP could adopt is from the recent 
APEC agreement to cut tariffs on fifty-four categories of goods 
that are seen as environmentally friendly.
249
 The agreement 
was seen as an environmental achievement but hardly a 
breakthrough because of its unenforceability.
250
 By integrating 
such provisions, the TPP would promote environmental 
progress while giving earlier agreements an enforcement 
mechanism not previously attainable. This agreement would 
likely be effective, because it would be easy to implement and 
monitor and would increase the export and use of 
environmentally friendly goods.  
The TPP could even look to implement a system of carbon 
taxes or border adjustments.
251
 Ideally, border adjustments 
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would apply to both imports and exports entering into 
international trade, enabling nations to offset the economic 
burdens associated with carbon taxes when trading countries 
vary in their tax regimes.
252
 Nations could tax imports from 
non-carbon-taxing countries based on their carbon content.
253
 
This would enable countries to “rectify domestic price 
differentials by taxing imported products at the same level as 
those produced domestically.”
254
 For exports, nations could offer 
rebates for carbon taxes paid by taxed producers for goods 
exported to other countries with carbon taxes.
255
 Countries 
would be able to refund the carbon taxes paid by their domestic 
producers for exported goods in order to prevent the double 
taxation of domestic producers by both the domestic state as 
well as the importing state.
256
 
Although carbon taxes coupled with border adjustments 
present a viable solution for reducing emissions, the unilateral 
adoption of such a regime “may well raise complex questions 
with respect to the WTO consistency and the conditions under 
which border taxes can be adjusted to accommodate a loss of 
international competitiveness.”
257
 These questions arise because 
 
(OECD) Working Party in 1970 defined border tax adjustments as “[A]ny fiscal 
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such a tax regime may be considered a barrier to trade, and 
therefore present a potential conflict with the rules of the 
WTO.
258
 However, recent legal research suggests that such a 
system would comport with international law.
259
  
The TPP should also encourage growth in green technology 
in order to promote strong investment in that sector. Currently, 
there is a WTO dispute regarding what particular types of 
green subsidies are permissible, something the TPP could 
clarify in order to foster more development of green 
technology.
260
 While it may seem counter-intuitive to 
environmental protection to limit subsidies on environmental 
goods, it is essential in order to promote long-term benefits. 
When countries are allowed to boost exports through green 
subsidies, foreign investment in green technology is negatively 
impacted due to artificially low cost alternatives.
261
 Long-term 
viability in industries, such as clean energy, rests on the ability 
to provide energy at an equal or lower cost than fossil fuels 
while maintaining equal or better performance.
262
 Subsidizing 
exports may promote the deployment of green technology in the 
short-term, but it reduces the incentive for countries to invest 
in the improvement of green technology, which is essential to 
progressing to a point where clean energy is less costly than the 
available alternative.
263
  
Of course these proposals will not have the desired effect 
without enforcement mechanisms tied into the TPP, but the 
potential agreement represents a great opportunity to hold 
countries to their commitments. The United States has a 
considerable advantage in trade negotiations because it 
represents the largest economy not only at the table, but in the 
world. Reducing barriers to trade with the United States and 
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other large countries could provide enormous benefits for 
developing nations, but giving up the ability to use tariffs and 
quotas without guarantees of stronger environmental 
protection measures would be foolish. The benefits of free trade 
are obvious, which is likely why so many countries are onboard 
with the TPP. If adopted, it would be the largest multilateral 
FTA in the world, and additional countries like Japan and 
Thailand are still considering joining.
264
  
As more countries join the TPP, countries that are left out 
will feel increasing pressure to join or lose out on the benefits 
that competing TPP member nations gain.
265
 Thus, requiring 
countries to adhere to certain environmental standards before 
obtaining membership in the TPP may create incentives for 
nations outside the agreement to improve environmental 
standards in hopes of gaining acceptance. The European Union 
(E.U.), while much more than a trade agreement, has a similar 
trade and economic structure though its amalgamation of 
numerous national governments and economies.
266
 Much like 
E.U. economic standards for membership, TPP members could 
consider a country’s environmental resume before agreeing to 
admit that country. TPP nations must already agree to promote 
sound environmental policies.
267
 Potential members’ current 
environment policies, environmental improvements over the 
past several years, and likelihood of continual improvement 
could all be factors considered before acceptance into the TPP. 
There could also be temporary membership for the first several 
years to ensure that countries abide by the environmental 
standards before giving them permanent membership.  
Once members are permanent, one of the more important 
enforcement mechanisms that should be integrated into the 
TPP are trade sanctions. While the effectiveness of trade 
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sanctions is often debated, economic studies have shown “that a 
punishing tariff can be effective when environmental and trade 
policies are endogenous.”
268
 The use of trade sanctions would 
not create the perfect balance between free markets and 
environmental protection but could be very effective.
269
 Unless 
the world can come together and implement global 
environmental taxes, there is little hope for incentivizing a 
significant level of environmental protection apart from trade 
sanctions.
270
 Trade and competition are significant causes of 
environmental problems, and the solution to those problems 
must be connected to the source.  
However, trade sanctions and other forms of ‘hard law’
271
 
are not favored by those who believe the “soft law approach” is 
more suitable for environmentally sustainable development.
272
 
The first problem presented by trade sanctions is the 
supranational enforcement agency that could be created to 
investigate and impose the sanctions, analogous to NAFTA’s 
CEC, except with greater authority. An outside force second-
guessing decisions of local and federal governments presents a 
unique and daunting challenge. It would also require a large 
bureaucracy to implement an independent multinational 
secretariat, which could possibly conflict with the constitutions 
of its member nations. While these are obvious legitimate 
concerns, the soft law approach alone is just too ineffective and 
“soft” to currently combat the increasingly dire environmental 
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picture.
273
 Ideally, trade sanctions would be rarely used and 
would mainly function as a deterrent. If they are to be used, 
however, it should be only when there is a clear violation of an 
environmental provision. A small increase on tariffs for the 
offender’s non-environmental goods would be an adequate 
sanction.  
It is important to ensure that sanctions are not too harsh 
or else they risk significantly stifling trade to the point where 
members no longer receive the expected economic benefits of 
the TPP.
274
 Implementing defined environmental standards 
with trade sanctions and/or significant monetary penalties for 
violators combined with the soft law approach taken by NAFTA 
and CAFTA-DR would be a substantial improvement over any 
current international environmental law system. The soft law 
approach should not be completely abandoned as organizations 
that research and propose new and effective ways to create 
environmental sustainability are important and should be 
given the proper funding and support to fulfill their goals.
275
 
The soft law approach, combined with these potential 
provisions to the TPP would finally internalize the costs of 
trade and production, and incentivize its members to promote 
environmental sustainability in the present day.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
FTAs remain an important part of global economic policy. 
As countries search for ways to economically grow, it is 
essential for them to realize the current path is not an 
economically sustainable one due to the present and future 
challenges that climate change and other environmental 
problems present. FTAs represent both a possible threat and 
solution to environmental sustainability, and may be the 
difference in whether the global community is able to prevent 
the predicted death of millions of people and trillions of dollars 
in lost prosperity due environmental problems.  
Although environmentalists greatly opposed both NAFTA 
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and CAFTA-DR,
276
 the measurable environmental effects of 
those trade agreements have not been as dire as previously 
predicted. Even the missteps of investor-state cases of NAFTA 
were corrected in CAFTA-DR and so far have been limited in 
scope. Extrapolating from that, there is not a large likelihood of 
investor-state cases in the TPP causing significant 
environmental effects, although the dispute resolution system 
can be improved from those of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR to 
provide more transparency and certainty. Even though the 
environmental impact of past FTAs has not been 
overwhelmingly negative, the TPP could go a long way towards 
actively protecting the environment in ways NAFTA and 
CAFTA-DR failed to do. There are several important 
environmental issues involving TPP members such as GHG 
emissions, overfishing, and illegal logging. The TPP could be a 
significant force in limiting these environmental problems.  
Outside of large economic agreements such as the TPP, 
there is little hope for effective international environmental 
law, putting more pressure on the negotiators of the TPP to 
succeed in including effective environmental provisions. 
Although world leaders have signed over 500 international 
environmental agreements in the last fifty years, there has 
been little progress toward environmental goals.
277
 In 2012 the 
Global Environmental Outlook researched the ninety most 
important environmental issues and found that significant 
progress had only been made in four.
278
 Environmental 
agreements are negatively impacted by the increasing amount 
of FTAs, lack of ratification or participation of important 
countries, and even the over-congestion of environmental 
agreements themselves. In the UN alone, thirty-five separate 
organizations influence global environmental governance.
279
 
This creates conflicting agendas and inconsistent rules and 
norms, which greatly impair the organizations’ abilities to 
complete their goals.
280
 Lack of enforcement remains the largest 
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issue as countries are unwilling to give up their sovereignty or 
economic advantages. Countries largely remain short-sighted 
on the environment. This lack of incentive to protect the 
environment on a global scale, combined with the tragedy of 
the commons issue and free-riding dilemmas, makes all current 
international environmental agreements insufficient.  
For these reasons, the TPP and similar trade agreements 
represent the best chance for true promotion of environmental 
sustainability. Because the economic benefits of the TPP 
increase with each new member, the agreement provides the 
leverage needed to compel its members and potential members 
to enforce their environmental agreements and create stronger 
ones. The TPP has the opportunity to set the standard for 
environmental sustainability by requiring potential members 
to improve their environmental policies in order to join. Actual 
members would also be held to high standards that require 
gradual improvement and are based on that country’s level of 
economic development.  
Trade sanctions, taxes, and monetary penalties would 
provide the enforcement mechanisms, which, when combined 
with the current soft law approach of NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, 
could create the first truly effective body of international 
environmental law. This would allow the TPP to include many 
environmental standards from other popular treaties that have 
previously been ineffective due to lack of enforcement. The goal 
of the environmental provisions is not to prohibit trade but to 
internalize the negative costs of trade and industrialization. 
Countries may lose some economic gains in the short term, but 
by doing so, they will prevent massive losses in the long term.  
Unfortunately for the environment and our future, strong 
environmental provisions that include real enforcement 
measures are not likely to be included in the TPP. The TPP is 
an expansive document and environmental concerns are not a 
high priority for many negotiating countries that want to focus 
on strengthening their economies. The United States and other 
countries’ main priority may be to marginalize China’s 
influence in the area, and therefore, they may be willing to 
exclude strong environmental provisions in order to reach an 
agreement. Additionally, the sheer number of countries 
involved makes detailed environmental provisions and 
standards hard to manage, and the public has had little say or 
influence over the document due to its secrecy in negotiations.  
Most of the additions to the TPP proposed in this comment 
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are not being considered in TPP negotiations and represent 
significant changes to past free trade agreements. If public was 
more aware of the TPP, perhaps proposed provisions such as 
these could gain more traction, but as it stands the TPP has not 
received the level of press that should be associated with such 
an important document. While the TPP may not pose a large 
threat to the environment, it is also unlikely to be the 
environmental savior that is severely needed. For the sake of 
present and future generations, we must hope that world 
leaders implement robust environmental protections before it is 
too late.  
 
